C omparative studies in biology use an investigative philosophy that many scientists identify as the "comparative method." In one sense, for those concerned with evolutionary history, the comparative method provides insights into adaptation by correlating differences among species with ecological factors (Futuyma 1986 ). In another sense, biologists often study the particular features of one species to learn about some aspect of a second species. C. Barker Jør-gensen (2001) reviewed the historical development of a fundamental tenet of the comparative method known as the "August Krogh principle" (AKP) and discussed the influences that both Claude Bernard and August Krogh had on the basic investigative principles of comparative physiology. Many have recognized Bernard as the father of modern physiology (e.g., Fox 2002) . His articulation of rigorous research methods and the concept of an "internal environment" ushered in the modern area of experimental physiology. Krogh was a brilliant researcher who specialized in comparative physiology, particularly areas relating to respiration. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1920 for his discovery of the mechanism regulating capillaries in skeletal muscle. Krogh's (1929a Krogh's ( , p. 247, 1929b statement,"For a large number of problems, there will be some animal of choice on which it can be most conveniently studied," eloquently captured a longstanding postulate of comparative biology. Specifically, Krogh encapsulated the idea, present long before Darwin, that parts or processes that are difficult or impossible to study in one species may be much more accessible in an alternate species. Hans Krebs (1975) formulated the August Krogh principle as "for many problems there is an animal on which it can be most conveniently studied."
As Jørgensen in his review (2001) pointed out, Krogh did not formulate his principle from scratch, but rather offered an explicit statement of a principle that was already generally accepted within comparative biology. Jørgensen presents an excellent argument for the historical role of Claude Bernard in the formulation of this principle:
There are also experiments in which it is proper to choose certain animals which offer favorable arrangements or special susceptibility to certain influences. This is so important that the solution of a physiological problem often depends solely on the appropriate choice of the animal for the experiment so as to make the result clear and searching (Bernard [1865 (Bernard [ ] 1957 .
Others have commented on AKP, and Jørgensen's review (2001) pointed out some philosophical missteps by these recent attempts to extend the principle (e.g., Feder and Watt 1992 , Wayne and Staves 1996 , Randall et al. 1997 ). Feder and Watt (1992) provide an alternative formulation of the AKP that shifts its logical scope and quantification, implicitly invoking a model of science in which all questions can be answered. Although Wayne and Staves (1996) do not claim to extend the principle itself, they propose a corollary to the AKP. The purported corollary is not a deductive consequence of the AKP, and it enjoins a shift in scope and quantification similar to the one made by Feder and Watt. Randall and colleagues (1997) invoke this shift yet again and attribute Krogh's success as a researcher to his ability to implement the AKP. In the following section, we critique each of these attempts to ex-tend the AKP as a means of demonstrating a recent and potentially harmful shift in the presentation and investigative philosophy of comparative biology.
In this article, we support Jørgensen (2001) in his arguments that Bernard and Krogh's conceptions of the comparative method are referenced and extended incorrectly. Jørgensen (2001) , however, does not report on the comparative method's long history prior to Claude Bernard. We provide a history of the comparative method that demonstrates that the ideas of Bernard and Krogh date to at least the ancient Greeks. We also identify a recent conceptual change in comparative studies and propose that this current methodology be referred to as the "comparative phylogenetic method" to conserve and respect the long-established history for the investigative philosophy known as the comparative method.
Investigative philosophy of the comparative method
Krebs's formulation of the AKP,"For many problems there is an animal on which it can be most conveniently studied," is an indispensable theorem in the development of contemporary comparative physiology. It provides a focal point in the history of that development, because it is the primary link between contemporary research and the successes of the field before to the rise of current statistical methods. Within comparative physiology, biologists wishing to establish a link to this historical success need only establish a link between their own research and the August Krogh principle. However, not all of these links pass philosophical muster. In this section, we take up where Jørgensen (2001) left off by providing a more detailed look at the problems arising from a failure to appreciate the logical implications of the AKP, before revisiting the history of comparative physiology in the second section. Feder and Watt (1992) reformulate the August Krogh principle as "for every biological question, there is an organism best suited to its solution." In moving from a statement concerning "many problems" to "every biological question, " Feder and Watt (1992) extended the principle by setting it within a contextual framework in which scientific methods are capable of answering all questions. This same commitment is evident in their shift from "most conveniently studied" to "best suited to its solution." While these changes may seem small or merely a matter of semantics, we believe they are very important in that they provide a misleading picture of the scientific enterprise and misrepresent the subtlety of research.
Good science includes asking the right questions.
For biology and other sciences, there is a continuing trend among the public toward thinking of science as a practice that answers questions rather than considering it as a practice focused on asking questions. As we consider the educational process, such shifts provide students and the public with the mistaken impression that our research will always provide answers to our questions. Because taxpayers and policymakers consider budgeting decisions or the ethical implications of research, it is essential that as scientists we do not oversell our product. Mistrust of science and medicine has been growing as promises of cures for diseases from cancer to AIDS to obesity have not materialized as fast as the public would like. Although it is true that a hallmark of good science has always been its ability to provide answers to our questions, answering questions is not the sole virtue of research. In some cases, research that fails to answer our questions today may provide the basis for tomorrow's work. Often, knowing that we are asking the wrong questions is essential to advancing our understanding. As both the corporate and public sponsors of research demand more accountability for the monies invested in research, it is essential that we not lose sight of the value of research for its own sake. Krogh's original formulation of the AKP is much better at capturing the successful practice of science and the nuances of conducting research. As such, the AKP is a tribute to Krogh's understanding of the need to ask the correct questions within comparative physiology and biological research in general-a point we will return to below.
Proposition of diversity.
In another discussion of the AKP, Wayne and Staves (1996) offered a supposed corollary: "No single organism (or technique) exists that can provide easy access to the diversity of hidden mechanisms that underlie all interesting and important physiological and biochemical problems." Although this proposition generates the same concerns as Feder and Watt's (1992) reformulation, we agree with Jørgenson (2001) that it does not follow logically from the AKP, although it is almost certainly true. In examining the logical relation between the AKP and Wayne and Staves' purported corollary, multiple problems arise. Even if we ignore the issues concerning logical quantification and scope (i.e., Wayne and Stave's change from "many" to "all"), there is still a major logical error in transitioning from Krogh's "for every question, there exists an organism on which it can be studied" to Wayne and Stave's "no single organism is suitable for studying all questions." If we do an analogous logical transition of the statement "for all extant populations, there exists an ancestral population," we get "there is no population that is ancestral to all extant populations." If current views of the origins of life are correct, it should be apparent that our original statement is true; yet, the transition results in a falsehood.
Despite these concerns, it is hard to imagine a biologist who would support the idea that there is a single organism on which we can study all physiological and biological questions, let alone the idea that such an organism would provide "easy access to the diversity of hidden mechanisms." Although Arabidopsis is used as a model system in a wide range of botanical research, it cannot, for instance, be used to study betalin production, as these pigments only occur in the Caryophyllidae (an order of plants that include Cacti, Portulaca and Bougainvillea). Likewise, E. coli and Caenorhabditis elegans are ubiquitous as model systems, but they cannot answer most questions relating to the reproductive physiology of vertebrates. If we step away from the desire to connect the principles of comparative physiology with the AKP and look to-ward a broader picture of the history and practices of comparative biology, we can appreciate that Wayne and Staves (1996) offered a valuable insight that is in line with that offered by Krogh and others. Wayne and Staves's statement, although not a true corollary to the AKP, continues Krogh's tradition of codifying commonsense principles of research into easily accessible propositions. As Jørgensen (2001) points out, Krogh's contribution to this point is his encapsulation of a fundamental truth of comparative biology into a single, simple statement of extreme eloquence. In this light, Wayne and Staves (1996) rendered an explicit, simple statement of an essential element of comparative biological theory, namely, that it thrives on the diversity of organisms and systems studied, rather than seeking a single system to answer all questions.
Public perceptions of scientific success. In introducing students to comparative physiology, Randall and colleagues (1997) state that "one of the reasons for Krogh's extraordinary success as a physiologist was his uncanny ability to choose just the right experimental animal with which to test his hypotheses. His view was that for every defined physiological problem, there was an optimally suited animal that would most efficiently yield an answer."As with the Feder and Watt reformulation, we see the overemphasis upon getting the answer to our question, thereby discounting research for its own sake. Because their statement appears in a textbook for undergraduates, it is understandable that Randall and his colleagues may be looking to simplify the AKP and avoid the complexities of dealing with the limits of "many problems" and the epistemological differences between "conveniently studied" and "efficiently yield an answer." This is what Gilovich (1991) would call a distortion in the service of informativeness. Gilovich, a social psychologist, contends that to most effectively convey the importance of a piece of information, it is often necessary to distort the account in which it is embedded. There is a deeper philosophical issue, however-the assertion that Krogh was a successful physiologist because he had the ability to choose the correct organisms for study. This claim may invert the causal relation between Krogh's success as a physiologist and his skills as a physiologist. We contend that it is at least as likely that Krogh was able to choose the correct animals because he was such an extraordinary physiologist, and to represent otherwise drastically distorts the image of science that is presented to undergraduates.
Consider the claim: "One of the reasons that T. H. Morgan was a successful geneticist is because he received material and financial support."Although there is no doubt that a portion of Morgan's success is attributable to the resources at his disposal, it is quite reasonable to ask whether those resources were made available to him owing to prior successes. Krogh's success as a comparative physiologist (i.e., his understanding physiological processes and the principles of comparative biology) not only enabled him to choose the correct animals but also provided him with the ability to ask insightful questions. We contend that when considering successful research programs, a full and appropriate understanding of the field will vastly increase the odds of choosing the correct model system. It is quite likely that Krogh, like many other researchers, leveraged his unique understanding of the field to identify questions that were both insightful and answerable. Put simply, we are asking whether Krogh was a successful physiologist as a result of his ability to choose the correct organisms or whether his ability to choose the correct organisms was a result of his success as a biologist. We cannot provide conclusive proof of causal priority in this case, and questions of this sort may not have a definitive answer; however, we do maintain that it is important that we do not accept any answer without proper consideration of the questions.
A history of comparative biology
The idea that the systems of an organism may be better understood by the use of comparison and contrast among organisms is an ancient idea. Aristotle (384-322 BC) sought common characters of organisms as a means of classification and explanation. Cole (1944) cites the writings of the Hippocratic School (4th century BC) concerning an attempt to compare the human skeleton to that of other vertebrates. Gardner (1965) Examining the works of 16th and 17th century biologists demonstrates that the conceptual foundations of the comparative method were well established within comparative anatomy more than 200 years before Bernard's work. Harvey was able to show his colleagues the beating hearts of shrimp owing to the transparency of their bodies. References to the comparative method in these works are not dependent upon modern translations. Consider Leach's 1653 translation of Harvey's comment that biologists remain ignorant of human biology because they are not sufficiently versed in the biology of other species:
Nevertheless were they but as well practiced in the dissection of creatures, as they are in the Anatomie of men's carcases, this business, which keeps them all in doubt and perplexitie, would in my opinion seem clear without all difficultie (Harvey [1628] 1653, p. 27). Cole (1944) also cites Harvey and then emphasizes the acceptance of comparative principles during the 17th century by quoting de Graaf and Collins: We consider that it is worth while to examine many animals of different species because what is often more condensed or more concealed in one species Nature displays more clearly and openly in another (de Graaf 1663, quoted in Cole 1944, p. 12).
I humbly conceive the great use of comparative anatomy is to illustrate the structure, actions, and uses of man's body, which are sometimes more clear in that of other animals, than in ours (Collins 1685 , quoted in Cole 1944 ).
Development and application of the comparative method continued with the work of Swammerdam ([1737 Swammerdam ([ -1738 1758), Daubenton (1749 Daubenton ( -1767 , Buffon ([1749 Buffon ([ -1788 1785), and others.
During the 19th century, the comparative method was applied to a broader range of biological questions. The results of both comparative anatomy and comparative physiology were subsumed under the more general study of natural history. Discussing general scientific methods and the peculiarities of natural history, Cuvier (1817) lamented the fact that biological phenomena often would not allow the opportunity to generate experimental conditions. He stated that with the insulation of a biological phenomenon "every vestige of life is annihilated." He was frustrated by what he saw as the essentially integrated nature of physiological processes within a given organism, but suggested that this problem could be solved by a careful examination of the conditions of existence and their final causes aimed at producing laws of observation. He concluded:
The most effectual method of obtaining these [laws of observation], is that of comparison. This consists in successively observing the same bodies in the different compositions in which nature places them, or in mutual comparison of different bodies; until we have ascertained invariable relations between their structures and the phenomena they exhibit. These various bodies are kinds of experiments ready prepared by Nature, who adds to or deducts from each of them different parts, just as we might wish to do in our laboratories, shewing us herself at the same time their various results (p. 3). Although Cuvier's message can be understood in the context of an Aristotelian worldview, his message was not lost on the biological community. Carpenter (1839) addressed this same issue by contrasting the research methods in chemistry, where one could isolate various compounds, with those of the physiologist, who could not isolate organs without destroying "those very conditions under which alone its functions can be normally performed." His remedy was drawn directly from Cuvier's work:
But a judicious and careful system of observation will almost supply the place of experiment; for the evervarying forms of organised beings by which we are surrounded, and the constantly-changing conditions in which they exist, present us with such numerous and different combinations of causes and effects, that it must be the fault of our mode of study if we do not arrive at some tolerably definite conclusions as to their mutual relations. In the language of Cuvier, the different forms of animals may be regarded as, "so many kinds of experiments ready prepared by Nature, who adds to or deducts from each of them different parts, just as we might wish to do in our laboratories, showing us herself at the same time their various results" (Carpenter 1839, p. 4).
Carpenter's solution is not merely an attempt to establish the methods of comparative physiology. Carpenter added that the "object of a Naturalist is to ascertain the laws which regulate the combination of the separate groups into living fabrics" (Carpenter 1839, p. 5) . He believed that this could only be accomplished through a combination of the findings of anatomy and physiology. Carpenter (1843) specifically stated that the phenomena of life must be understood from both a structural and functional perspective. Anatomy is the study of structure, while physiology is the study of function. Function was linked to physiology when he discussed the function of nutrition as "conversion of this material into new cells, fibres, &c. [etcetera] in connection with those previously formed" (Carpenter 1843, p. 27) . While he acknowledges the separation of anatomy and physiology, he states that the proper study of each must include reference to the broader biological understanding offered by natural history. He contends that students of physiology must be able to ascertain the structures necessary for the occurrence of physiological phenomena.
During the 19th century, the comparative method in biology gained increasing acceptance and use, culminating in its most famous use-Darwin's (1859) presentation of evolutionary theory. Darwin was well aware of Carpenter's work, as evidenced by his citation (1868) of Carpenter's work on comparative physiology. The comparative method as established in the work of Harvey, Cuvier, Carpenter, and others allowed Darwin to provide the theoretical framework supporting "homology" as an explanatory concept buttressing his theory of evolution. With the publication of On the Origin of Species, the theoretical underpinnings of the term homology were forever altered, and evolutionary theory provided a new and even more compelling reason for comparative studies within biology-common ancestry.
While acknowledging Bernard's contributions to the experimental study of physiology, we believe it is a mistake to grant him too large a role in the founding of comparative physiology. Bernard (1865) clearly explicated the values of the comparative method:
Some experiments would be impossible with certain species of animals, an intelligent choice of an animal offering a happy anatomical arrangement is often a condition essential to the success of an experiment and to the solution of an important physiological problem (p. 117).
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There are also experiments in which it is proper to choose certain animals, which offer favorable anatomical arrangements or special susceptibility to certain influences. For each kind of investigation we shall be careful to point out the proper choice of animals. This is so important that the solution of a physiological or pathological problem often depends solely on the appropriate choice of the animal for the experiment so as to make the result clear and searching (p. 123).
It is statements such as these that have earned Bernard a central place in the historical development of comparative biology. Jørgensen (2001) is absolutely correct in his insistence that we not underestimate the importance of Bernard's work as a precursor to Krogh's contributions; nevertheless, it is equally important that we recognize the contributions by his predecessors in comparative biology.
This brings us to the work of A.V. Hill and August Krogh, both of whom set the stage for Krebs's popular formulation: "For many problems there is an animal on which it can be most conveniently studied." Both Hill and Krogh offered simplified interpretations of Bernard's basic ideas on the comparative method. The similarity of their views can be seen in the following quotes:
By the method of comparative physiology or of experimental biology, by the proper choice of a suitable organ, tissue, or process, in some animal far removed in evolution we may often throw light upon some function or process in the higher animals or man (Hill 1929, quoted without reference in Ratliff 1967, p. 471) .
For a large number of problems, there will be some animal of choice on which it can be most conveniently studied (Krogh 1929a (Krogh , p. 247, 1929b In their discussions of Krogh's formulation, Krebs (1975) and Jørgensen (2001) Jørgensen (2001) points out the importance of Bernard during the development of the comparative method and suggests that Krogh most likely benefited professionally from his association with Bernard's legacy. It is not surprising that Krogh's simplified statement regarding the model organisms became known as the August Krogh principle. Overemphasis on Krogh's role in the development of comparative biology, however, not only fails to appreciate the history of the comparative method but also represents an injustice to comparative biologists from Galen to Cuvier to A.V. Hill and beyond. Although Krogh has gained a measure of immortality by having the principle named in his honor, this should not diminish our appreciation of all of the individuals who have contributed to the development of this principle.
The comparative method revisited
While the general principles and practices of comparative biology were developed before the advent of evolutionary theory, the explanatory scope and power of comparative studies has expanded. In recent years, the term comparative method has been increasingly used to refer to a set of statistical procedures for reconstructing phylogenies and for controlling for phylogenetic effects during inter-and intrataxon comparisons (Harvey and Pagel 1991) . The major concern with statistical comparisons across taxa is the failure to account for the role of identity by descent in producing shared characteristics (Felsenstein 1985) . Felsenstein contends that because species and other taxa evolve within a nested hierarchy, the features of two related taxa may not be evolutionarily independent. Thus, assuming that taxa evolved independently when performing comparative statistical analyses to test phylogenetic hypotheses risks overestimating the degrees of freedom. Felsenstein (1985) and Harvey and Pagel (1991) outline multiple procedures for avoiding this problem. While it is clear that these procedures are invaluable within evolutionary studies, they represent a subtle shift away from the traditional practices of comparative biology. Felsenstein (1985) , Harvey and Pagel (1991) , Brooks and McClennan (1991) , Weins (2000) , and others show that comparative studies that do not control for phylogenetic relationships may imply spurious relationships between adaptive traits and their environments. As these statistical methods improve and as the considerations of phylogenetic effects pervade the consciousness of biologists, these same biologists are now referring to the statistical controls as "the comparative method."We believe this trend has confused two very different practices within biology. We assert that this narrow emphasis on statistical procedures related to phylogenetic effects collapses two historically and philosophically distinct traditions within comparative biology.
Before the acceptance of evolutionary theory, comparative studies were seen as a way to understand one of God's creations in the light of a second one. In the absence of natural selection, there was no generally accepted natural mechanism that could link the characters of one organism to another (Dobzhansky 1973) . However, in an evolutionary context, comparative studies allow us to make inferences about the evolutionary histories of both organisms. It is possible to infer ancestral states, selective effects, phylogenetic relatedness, and other aspects of the organisms' evolutionary histories. There is no question that comparative biology is much more robust in an evolutionary context; it is essential, however, that we recognize the conceptual shift that has occurred in comparative biology as it has been applied to explicitly evolutionary questions.
Although Harvey, Collins, Cuvier, and others writing before Darwin engaged in comparative biology and wrote extensively about its methods and practices, there was no ref-erence to or assumption of relatedness between the organisms they studied. In a similar vein, when Bernard and Krogh discussed comparative studies, they were emphasizing the value of considering a wide range of organisms when seeking answers to biological questions. Numerous authors have championed the use of the comparative method in an explicitly evolutionary context to answer phylogenetic questions. Although we advocate this type of research, we believe that it is possible to perform fruitful comparative studies of the type advocated by the AKP without reference to the evolutionary histories of the organisms involved, depending upon the goals of the research. We also believe that limiting the comparative method to a set of statistical procedures has the potential to devalue comparative biology in the tradition of Krogh and Bernard. In The Comparative Method in Evolutionary Biology, Harvey and Pagel (1991) state,"An assessment of phylogenetic relationships is a prerequisite for a successful comparative analysis" (p. 35). The truthfulness of this pronouncement depends upon the inferences one is trying to make with that comparative analysis; however, for those who are not familiar with the general principles and practices of comparative biology, phylogenetic analyses may come to represent the sole virtue of comparative biology.
Although all research in modern biology occurs in an implicitly evolutionary context, it is still possible to make comparisons without regard to the phylogenetic relationships between organisms. One example of the AKP is the Human Genome Project, which benefits from work on Drosophila and E. coli. A simpler example is the use of the wonderfully large nerves of squid to demonstrate basic neurological principles. These studies do not attempt to infer evolutionary histories. Thus, there is no need to control for phylogenetic effects.
Although we cannot begin to acknowledge all of the scientists who contributed to comparative biology, we would like to offer the work of Prosser and colleagues (1950) as an example of comparative biology identified with the traditional practices of the comparative method. They state:
Comparative animal physiology integrates and coordinates functional relationships which transcend special groups of animals. It is concerned with the ways in which diverse organisms perform similar functions. Genetically dissimilar organisms may show striking similarities in characteristics and response to the same environmental stimulus (p. 1).
Historically, comparative biology has investigated the similarities and differences in the morphology and physiology of organisms. This convention is being confused with the new statistical approach to comparative biology that emphasizes identifying phylogenetic relationships and controlling for them. We suggest that this practice is more appropriately termed the "comparative phylogenetic method." In this way, we can distinguish between those who use the study of a system in one organism to "show light on that of another" and those that use statistical methods to infer and control for phylogenetic relationships. In conclusion, we contend that a full appreciation of the historical development and philosophical approach of comparative biology provides compelling reasons for distinguishing the traditional comparative method from the "comparative phylogenetic method."
